On bargaining sets for finite economies

Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result, this Edgeworth bargaining set shrinks to the set of Walrasian allocations.

Keywords: Bargaining sets; coalitions; core; veto mechanism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D11 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-18, Revised 2014-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:62303

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