A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations

María Gómez-Rúa and Juan Vidal-Puga

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, so that the planner can identify the agents that merge. Under this new framework, and as opposed to the traditional model, there exist rules that satisfy merge-proofness. Besides, by strengthening this property and adding some other properties, such as population-monotonicity and solidarity, we characterize a unique rule that coincides with the weighted Shapley value of an associated cost game.

Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree problems; cost sharing; core selection; cost-monotonicity; merge-proofness; weighted Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D61 D63 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:62923

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