Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

Ruffin-Benoît Ngoie () and Berthold E.-L. Ulungu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system.

Keywords: Aggregation; Approval Voting; Borda Majority Count; Majority Judgment; Social Choice Function. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B16 C10 C65 C70 C73 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12-19, Revised 2015-01-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research 1.4(2015): pp. 177-182

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:62938

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