Tenure-Track Contract Helps Self-Selection

Sergey Popov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Tenure contract is criticized for curbing the incentives for spending effort after obtaining the tenured status. Yet, the best faculty seems to work on a tenure contract, and schools who employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer a tenure-track contract to their new hires. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.

Keywords: tenure; academia; job market; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 J4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Tenure-track contract helps self-selection (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:63018

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