Horizontal and Vertical Firm Networks, Corporate Performance and Product Market Competition

Oliver Bischoff and Achim Buchwald

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the assessment of firm networks via multiple directorships in terms of corporate firm performance. Using a large sample of European listed firms in the period from 2003 to 2011 and system GMM we find a significant compensation effect on corporate firm performance for the initial negative effect of horizontal multiple directorships by product market competition. In markets with effective competition, horizontal multiple directorships turn out to be an efficient mechanism to increase firm performance and thus assure competitive advantages. By contrast, linkages between up- and downstream firms have no significant influence on financial performance, irrespective of the level of competition intensity.

Keywords: Horizontal and Vertical Firm Networks; Multiple Directorships; Corporate Governance; Product Market Competition; Dynamic Panel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 G32 G34 L14 L25 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ind and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Horizontal and Vertical Firm Networks, Corporate Performance and Product Market Competition (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:63413

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