In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective

Jeroen Hinloopen, Grega Smrkolj and Florian Wagener

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as well as initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke price. Firms that collude develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus.

Keywords: Antitrust policy; Bifurcations; Collusion; R&D cooperatives; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D92 L13 L41 O31 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03-16, Revised 2015-04-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective (2013)
Working Paper: In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:63551

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