Socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations and privatization in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

Konstantinos Eleftheriou and Nickolas Michelacakis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We generalize Beladi et al. (2014) for any non-negative, increasing, continuous function of distance as transportation costs function. By doing so, we show that in a duopoly, partial privatization does not change the socially optimal character of the Nash equilibrium location. Our results call for further research on testing their robustness under the existence of more than two competing firms.

Keywords: Privatization; Spatial competition; Transportation costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L32 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63893/1/MPRA_paper_63893.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66317/9/MPRA_paper_66317.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84850/1/MPRA_paper_84850.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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