Market for Corporate Control and Contractual Buyout (CoBO): A New “Collective Ownership-and-Administrative” Strategy

Srinivasa Reddy Kotapati

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Contractual buyout (CoBO) is a new “collective ownership and joint administrative strategy”, which gives an opportunity to buy a target firm in the given period when the given contract ends between acquirer, target firm, and financier. It is a takeover defensive method and tends to avail tax advantage via entering CoBO deal. In particular, it would be efficient inorganic magnetic for international venture capitalists and private equity firms while entering foreign markets. More specifically, CoBO is likely a concept of Dating-before-Merging and it would be the better model for cross-border mergers and acquisitions integration strategy. The explored CoBO propositions may be useful in various implications such as information symmetry and administrative changes, employment and employee role, operating performance and financial arrangement, tax savings, choice of market entry strategy, integration strategy, and government and policy makers. We recommend the developed country investors choose CoBO as investment vehicle to avail the competent business opportunities in both emerging and budding economies.

Keywords: Contractual buyout; Collective ownership; Inorganic strategy; Leveraged buyout; Market for corporate control; Mergers and acquisitions; Strategic alliances, Takeovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F2 F21 F23 F4 F6 F63 L1 L2 L5 M1 M16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015, Revised 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cta
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