The Effects Of Neighborhood On Tax Compliance Rates: Evidence From An Agent Based Model

Mehmet Oğuz Arslan and Özgür İcan ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of neighborhood on tax compliance behavior of taxpayers based on an agent based tax compliance model To this aim it is attempted to find out different tax compliance patterns under different “penalty rate audit rate” combinations and for von Neumann neighborhood Moore neighborhood and no neighborhood schemes The findings throw into sharp relief that both von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods are reducing compliance behavior of taxpayers considerably The results of scenario runs put the case clearly Key Words: Tax Compliance Agent Based Modeling NetLogo Özet Bu çalışma bir birey tabanlı vergi uyum modeline dayalı olarak komşuluk etkilerinin mükelleflerin vergi uyum davranışına etkilerini araştırmaktadır Bu amaçla farklı “ceza oranı denetim oranı” kombinasyonlarında ve von Neumann komşuluğu ve Moore komşuluğu ile komşuluğun olmadığı durum için farklı vergi uyum örnekleri bulunmaya çalışılmıştır Bulgular açıkça ortaya koymaktadır ki von Neumann ve Moore komşuluklarının her ikisi de mükelleflerin uyum davranışını büyük ölçüde azaltmaktadır Senaryo çalıştırmaları bu durumu açıkça göstermektedir Anahtar Kelimeler: Vergi Uyumu Birey Tabanlı Modelleme NetLogo

Keywords: Tax Compliance; Agent-Based Modeling; NetLogo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Published in Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 1.22(2013): pp. 337-350

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