Моделирование формирования инвестиционной стоимости инструментов корпоративного контроля

Modeling of investment value formation of corporate control instruments

Georgiy Kolesnik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A game-theoretical model of the investment value formation of the instruments of corporate control (shares or stakes in equity) is formulated and analyzed. It is shown that this value depends significantly on the allocation of equity among the owners, and the on the possibilities of the owners’ alliances formation.

Keywords: investment value; appraisal; capitalization; property rights; corporate control; cooperative game; coalition; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-05
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Published in Экономика и математические методы 3.46(2010): pp. 93-100

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Journal Article: Моделирование формирования инвестиционной стоимости инструментов корпоративного контроля (2010)
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