New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking

Ruffin-Benoît Ngoie (), Zoïnabo Savadogo and Berthold E.-L. Ulungu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean.

Keywords: Borda Majority Count; Majority Judgment; Mean-Median Compromise Method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 D63 D71 D72 I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09-15, Revised 2014-12-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Advanced Studies in Contemporary Mathematics 1.25(2015): pp. 19-38

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64155/1/MPRA_paper_64155.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:64155

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().