How asymmetric funding of parties can lead to political polarization

Monika Köppl Turyna
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Monika Irena Köppl-Turyna

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of parties using a formal model of elections. Main results show that when a party faces a tight financial constraint the platform chosen in equilibrium is further away from its ideal point compared to the case when the campaign expenses are not limited. Moreover, we have shown that the platform of the party which is facing a tighter financial constraint is further away from its ideal point than of the opponent. These results show the theoretical foundations for the empirical observations made, about the impact of public funding of parties on their platforms.

Keywords: campaign finance; polarization; endogenous valence; public funding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75459/1/MPRA_paper_75459.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:64200

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