Two-candidate competition with endogenous valence: a differential game approach

Monika Köppl Turyna
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Monika Irena Köppl-Turyna

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We propose a differential game approach to analyze two--candidate competition in a la Hotelling game with candidates simultaneously choosing locations and investment in valence. We find a Markov perfect equilibrium in which candidates choose divergent locations. Divergence from the median is increasing if the parameter measuring the importance of policy relative to valence is decreasing and if valence depreciates slowly. The results are generalizable to a version of the game with probabilistic voting, that is with a stochastic state equation.

Keywords: differential game; two--candidate competition; valence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64203/1/MPRA_paper_64203.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:64203

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().