Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring

Yuval Heller

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. I present a mild equilibrium refinement that requires robustness against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents, and I show that only defection satisfies this mild refinement among all the equilibria in the existing literature, unless one assumes either (1) communication among the players, or (2) sufficient correlation between the private signals (conditional on the action-profile).

Keywords: Belief-free equilibrium; evolutionary stability; imperfect private monitoring; repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; communication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64485/1/MPRA_paper_64485.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68643/1/MPRA_paper_68643.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75990/2/MPRA_paper_75990.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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