Tie-Breaking Rules and Divisibility in Experimental Duopoly Markets
Daniela Puzzello
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
We investigate pricing behavior of sellers in duopoly markets with posted prices and market power. The two treatment variables are given by tie-breaking rules and divisibility of the price space. The first treatment variable deals with the rule under which demanded units are allocated between sellers in case of a price tie. A change in divisibility is modeled by making the sellers’ price space finer or coarser. We find that the incidence of perfect collusion is significantly higher under the sharing tie-breaking rule than under the random (coin-toss) one, especially when the price space is less divisible.
Keywords: Collusion; Tie-breaking rules; Divisibility; Bertrand model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6453/1/MPRA_paper_6453.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Tie-breaking rules and divisibility in experimental duopoly markets (2008) 
Working Paper: Tie-Breaking Rules and Divisibility in Experimental Duopoly Markets (2007) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6453
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