Choix social et préférence collective: analyse a posteriori de l’élection présidentielle de 2011 en République Démocratique du Congo
Social choice and collective value: A posteriori analysis of 2011 presidential election in Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ruffin-Benoît Ngoie () and
Berthold E.-L. Ulungu
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
The official results analysis of the Congolese presidential elections in 2011 aims at studying behavior displayed by voters towards the selected mode of poll. This reveals that most of them carry out a strategic vote because feeling, in an intuitive way, weaknesses of a single member voting system. This paper characterizes congolese voters’ behavior by province and reveals, in addition, that there would be a mechanism making it possible to pass from a preferences profile to another which would facilitate inductions. New concepts were brought there, in particular the preferences transformation function (PTF) and the Pseudo-Condorcet Winner of (PCW).
Keywords: Elections; Game of vote; Mode of poll; several-member voting system; single-member voting system; Strategic vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D70 D71 D72 I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-28, Revised 2015-01-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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