Prisoner’s dilemma for EU bank groups

Miroslav Nedelchev

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: What happenned after 2007 requires that new kind of instruments applied in order to face the global financial crisis. Non-coordinated actions undertaken by a single bank group have additionally sharpened the effects of the crisis and have resulted in the must of joint efforts which are better known as the "prisoner's dilemma".

Keywords: prisoner’s dilemma; bank groups; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 G1 G2 G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Published in International & Interdisciplinary scientific conference “Vanguard scientific instruments in management ‘2012” (2012): pp. 427-432

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