Bertrand-Edgeworth games under triopoly: the payoffs
Massimo De Francesco () and
Neri Salvadori ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity constrained sellers beyond duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. The main focus is on the equilibrium payoffs under triopoly. The paper also includes insightful examples highlighting features of equilibrium which can arise in a triopoly but not in a duopoly. Most notably, the supports of the equilibrium strategies need not be connected, nor need be connected the union of the supports; further, an atom may exist for a firm different from the largest one.
Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth; Price game; Oligopoly; Triopoly; Mixed strategy equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D47 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:64638
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