Economic indicators for the presence of tacit collusion in merger control under varied focal points

Adrian Proctor

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article discusses how different focal points in a market can lead to different collusive agreements and how merger analysis can identify markets that may be vulnerable to these potential agreements. Focal points based on customer allocation and geographic markets are considered with recent UK examples of this type of analysis. The focal point firms are using for coordination can affect the transparency required to maintain coordination and how targeted or effective any punishment for deviation can be.

Keywords: Identifying Tacit Coordination; Customer Geographic Focal points; Collusion; Merger Analysis. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L4 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11, Revised 2014-03
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Published in World Competition 38.2(2015): pp. 253-280

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