Capital Tax as a Consequence of Bargaining

Yuta Saito

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study an OLG model in which heterogenous agents bargain over capital taxation. In our model, both of the balance of bargaining power and threat point, that standard median voter models have not considered, are endogenized. We show that the two key features are crucial determinants for political as well as economic outcomes.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; wealth inequality; capital taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H20 H30 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:65338

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