Failed bank auctions and externalities

Tim Zhou

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We measure the negative externalities experienced by non-winning bidders and examine the determinants of these externalities in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) failed bank auctions. We show that unsuccessful bidders experience significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns when winning bidders enter non-winning bidders’ key markets as a new entrant by acquiring relatively larger targets and when infrequent bidders are involved.

Keywords: FDIC; Banks; Auction; Externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D62 G14 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-gth and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:65587

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