Nonlinear Pricing

Mark Armstrong

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I survey the use of nonlinear pricing as a method of price discrimination, both with monopoly and oligopoly supply. Topics covered include an analysis of when it is profitable to offer quantity discounts and bundle discounts, connections between second- and third-degree price discrimination, the use of market demand functions to calculate nonlinear tariffs, the impact of consumers with bounded rationality, bundling arrangements between separate sellers, and the choice of prices for upgrades and add-on products.

Keywords: Nonlinear pricing; price discrimination; bundling; multidimensional screening; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D42 L13 L15 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-mkt, nep-ore and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Nonlinear Pricing (2016)
Working Paper: Nonlinear Pricing (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:65779

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