How Does Privatization Work in China?
Lu Jiangyong () and
Zhigang Tao ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Using a comprehensive panel data set of China’s state-owned enterprises, we investigate the impacts of privatization, of different time sequences and extent of non-state ownership, on social welfare and firm performance. Attention has been focused on the sources of gain in firm performance and the long-run impacts of privatization. It is found that the privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on social welfare responsibilities, and significant gain in firm performance was obtained by motivating the management and reducing agency cost at the management level.
JEL-codes: L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-dev and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6599/1/MPRA_paper_6599.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: How does privatization work in China? (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6599
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().