Institutional design and implicit incentives in Bolivia's decentralization model

Gover Barja Daza, Sergio Villarroel-Böhrt and David Zavaleta

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The second generation fiscal federalism approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. Sub-national public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. Panel models were estimated at sub-national levels to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model.

Keywords: Second generation fiscal decentralization; panel models; Bolivia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 H71 H72 H73 H75 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Latin American Journal of Economic Development 19 (2013): pp. 137-211

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Related works:
Journal Article: Institutional Design and Implicit Incentives in Bolivia's Decentralization Model (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66050

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