Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Alexander Elbittar (), Andrei Gomberg and Laura Sour

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We conduct a laboratory study of the group-on group ultimatum bargaining with restricted within-group interaction. In this context, we concentrate on the effect of different within-group voting procedures on the bargaining outcomes. Our experimental observations can be summarized in two propositions. First, individual responder behavior across treatments does not show statistically significant variation across voting rules, implying that group decisions may be viewed as aggregations of independent individual decisions. Second, we observe that proposer behavior significantly depends (in the manner predicted by a simple model) on the within-group decision rule in force among the responders and is generally different from the proposer behavior in the one-on-one bargaining.

Keywords: bargaining games; group decision making; experimental design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66067/1/MPRA_paper_66067.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study (2011)
Working Paper: Group decision-making and voting in ultimatum bargaining: an experimental study (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66067

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().