Grade Inflation and Education Quality

Raphael Boleslavsky and Christopher Cotton

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a game in which schools compete to place graduates in two distinct ways: by investing in the quality of education, and by strategically designing grading policies. In equilibrium, schools issue grades that do not perfectly reveal graduate abilities. This leads evaluators to have less-accurate information when hiring or admitting graduates. However, compared to fully-revealing grading, strategic grading motivates greater investment in educating students, increasing average graduate ability. Allowing grade inflation and related grading strategies can increase the probability evaluators select high-ability graduates.

Keywords: strategic grading; grade inflation; education quality; school competition; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08-23
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66119/1/MPRA_paper_66119.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Grade Inflation and Education Quality (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66119

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