Unique Stationary Behavior

Yuval Heller and Erik Mohlin (erik.mohlin@nek.lu.se)

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study environments in which agents from a large population are randomly matched to play a one-shot game, and, before the interaction begins, each agent observes noisy information about the partner's aggregate behavior. Agents follow stationary strategies that depend on the observed signal. We show that every strategy distribution admits a unique behavior if each player observe on average less than action of his partner. On the other hand, if each player observes on average more than one action, we show that there exists a stationary strategy that admits multiple consistent outcomes.

Keywords: Markovian process; Random matching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66179

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