The economic analysis of a Q-learning model of Cooperation with punishment
Viviana Solferino and
Serena Taurino ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
A Q-learning model is devised in order to see whether individuals can "learn" how to cooperate, when a virtuous system of punishment and reinforcement is adopted. The paper shows that, if it is possible to free-ride and not being adequately punished, there will always be an incentive to deviate from cooperation. Conversely, even if the others did not cooperate, it is still possible to have someone who cooperates when individuals are pushed by strong intrinsec motivations. Cooperation can be a learning process. It is possible to trigger a learning process that leads individuals to be equally cooperative. This happens much more easily, the more responsible the individuals are. It also depends on proper punishment.
Keywords: Cooperation; punishment; q-learning models. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71684/8/MPRA_paper_66880.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
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