Conformist Preferences in Mixed-Motive Games

Michael Naef and Alessandro Sontuoso

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We examine a novel class of conformist preferences which falls within the realm of belief-dependent motivations in that the peers’ expectations about others’ behavior may affect every group-member’s welfare. Similar other-regarding motivations, like guilt-aversion, have been inferred from evidence of a belief-behavior correlation but the issue of causality has been disputed. In examining conformism we propose a design that verifies the presence of the relevant causality direction while ruling out alternative other-regarding motivations. Our data reveal “self-servingly conformist” behavior in that subjects choose to match their strategy to the peers’ expectations when it is in their interest to do so.

Keywords: conformist preferences; consensus effects; belief-dependent utility; guilt aversion; social norms; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Consensus vs. Conformity in Mixed-Motive Games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66965

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