Cournot tatonnement in aggregative games with monotone best responses

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper establishes the acyclicity of Cournot tatonnement in a strategic game with aggregation and monotone best responses, under the broadest assumptions on aggregation rules allowing the Huang-Dubey-Haimanko-Zapechelnyuk-Jensen trick to work and with minimal topological restrictions.

Keywords: Cournot tatonnement; Cournot potential; aggregative game; monotone best responses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66976

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