A dirty deed done dirt cheap: reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians

Aurélie Cassette and Etienne Farvaque

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school rhythm in France provides the ground for a verification of this hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities and if they belong to the governing coalition. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically, offering a double gain to the government. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms the perception of the local cost of the reform.

Keywords: Reforms; Elections; Municipalities; Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D04 D72 D78 H77 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-ure
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Related works:
Journal Article: A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians (2016)
Working Paper: A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:67031

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