A Comment on "Multilateral Bargaining"

Amit Kumar Maurya

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining, and claim that their analysis is applicable irrespective of whether the surplus exists at the start of the game or it is created after all players agree. We show that their claim is wrong. Their analysis is not applicable when the surplus is created after all players agree. Hence, some of the important real life bargaining situations, like management-multiple unions bargaining and land assembly are not in the scope of Krishna and Serrano (1996).

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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