A decomposition for the space of games with externalities

Joss Sanchez-Perez ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to present a different perspective than the more `traditional' approaches to study solutions for games with externalities. We provide a direct sum decomposition for the vector space of these games and use the basic representation theory of the symmetric group to study linear symmetric solutions. In our analysis we identify all irreducible subspaces that are relevant to the study of linear symmetric solutions and we then use such decomposition to derive some applications involving characterizations of classes of solutions.

Keywords: Games with externalities; value; representation theory; symmetric group. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C65 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:67932

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