Vertical Mergers and Downstream Spatial Competition with Different Product Varieties, Revised and Corrected
Konstantinos Eleftheriou and
Nickolas Michelacakis
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., Marjit, S., 2008. Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties. Economics Letters 101, 262-264]. Specifically, we prove that in the pre-merger case, Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, whereas a vertical merger will relocate downstream firms by making them move to the right of their socially optimal positions while keeping their in-between distance intact.
Keywords: Price discrimination; Spatial competition; Merger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68107/1/MPRA_paper_68107.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:68107
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().