The limits of wise exploitation in dependent and independent symmetric ensembles

Thomas Friedrich

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Selfish motivated violence and deception are considered as harmful to the performance of a group; therefore, should have negative effects in animal and human societies and are thus condemned as amoral in human societies. Here, I investigate more deeply a recently discovered ethos (i.e. the characteristic spirit of a culture) called wise exploitation. In an ensemble with this ethos violence and deception are an essential part of the success, explaining the organized occurrence of both. The transfer of substrate from source to sink induced by violence and deception will be superadditive within certain limits. In case this superadditivity is able to pay all investments like brute force, deception, reciprocity, information costs, transfer costs, at least one surviving offspring and a premium, the transfer is called wise and will be better in comparison to no transfer and simple additivity. In comparison to the weaker and peaceful ensembles, wise exploitation is active in a different part of substrate availability. This ethos will not end in the Nash equilibrium because biologic systems are open systems continuously powered by the sun. The exploited party will not be lost as offspring will continue the function as a source of benefits or as a sink of costs. In case there is no genetic tradition there will be a tradition of functionality organized.

Keywords: source; sink; ensemble; brute force; deception; superadditivity; subadditivity; wise exploitation; prudent master; benefit; cost; net profit; reciprocity; reward; Nash equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; Homo Economicus; social dilemma; Snowdrift game; Stag-Hunt game; Prisoner´s dilemma; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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