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Costly Preplay Communication and Coordination in Stag-Hunt Games

Muruvvet Buyukboyaci and Serkan Küçükşenel ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we experimentally investigate the impact of costly indirect and direct messages on coordination levels in a stag-hunt game. We also compare the coordination rates with costly pre-play communication to the rates with costless pre-play communication. Three main insights emerge from our experiments. First, we find a significant decrease in message usage with message cost in both treatments and a higher decrease in the indirect-message treatment. Second, we find that although there is no significant effect of costless or costly indirect messages on the frequency of risky actions, both costless and costly direct messages significantly increase the frequency of risky actions. Third, while we find a significant increase in the coordination rate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium from costless indirect message treatment to costly indirect message treatment, this rate significantly decreases from costless direct message to costly direct message treatment. Our findings show that depending on the structure of messages, message cost may increase or decrease the coordination rates on the payoff-dominant equilibrium.

Keywords: coordination; cheap talk; pre-play communication; risk information; costly messages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Costly Pre‐Play Communication and Coordination in Stag‐Hunt Games (2017) Downloads
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