The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates: A note on the US 2016 presidential election

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The manner in which US presidential elections are organized make them ripe for empirical manifestations of the “voting paradoxes” identified by social choice theorists. This note illustrates the general point with polling data involving the two leading Democrats and the three leading Republicans at the beginning of the 2016 presidential primaries, suggesting that all five candidates may be alternatives in one or more cyclical majorities, i.e., where no candidate cannot be beaten by at least one other candidate.

Keywords: Social choice; Condorcet paradox; Borda paradox; US presidential election 2016; Hillary Clinton; Bernard Sanders; Donald Trump; Ted Cruz; Marco Rubio. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:69171

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