The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights

Patrick Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a simple bilateral trading example with discrete valuations and costs it is demonstrated that in the presence of private information the efficiency of Coasean bargaining may be strictly enhanced if initially no property rights are assigned.

JEL-codes: D82 K1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in European Journal of Law and Economics 1.11(2001): pp. 23-28

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Journal Article: The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6929

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