Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information

Patrick Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper illustrates in a simple model how the presence of asymmetric information can make it impossible to achieve ex post efficient trade decisions in negotiations.

JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Published in Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 32.4(2003): pp. 239-242

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6934

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