A bargaining-Walras approach for finite economies

Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We give a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Moreover, we also show that justified objections equate with Walrasian objections. Our bargaining-Walras equivalence provides a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas-Colell (1989) for continuum economies. Some further results highlight whether it is possible to restrict the formation of coalitions and still get the bargaining set. Finally, recasting some known characterizations of Walrasian allocations, we state additional interpretations of the bargaining set.

Keywords: Bargaining sets; coalitions; core; veto mechanism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D11 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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