Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate

Aggey Semenov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a key government department. The operating unit of the department has private information about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the Senate is sufficiently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more authority. On the other hand, given the Senate's ideal point, when the information is more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds.

Keywords: Appointments; bargaining; veto-based delegation; constrained delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 D82 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6988/1/MPRA_paper_6988.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8521/1/MPRA_paper_8521.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:6988

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().