Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise

Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we present a new n-person bargaining solution, which we call Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise. We show that this solution is the unique solution satisfying a new axiom called Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Decomposability.

Keywords: Cooperative bargaining; Nash solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70614/1/MPRA_paper_70614.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise (2017)
Working Paper: Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:70614

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