Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives

Paul Missios and Charles Plourde

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A simple, two-country theoretical model of transboundary fishing conflicts in which one country has a nonlucrative incentive to conserve the fish stock is presented to examine the effect of such a conservation motive on the steady state stock level and to analyze how this stock level is affected by the division of the harvest. It is demonstrated that a conservation motive for one or both countries serves to increase the stock level and that this level is dependent on the harvest share of the country with the motive. A brief application to the Canada-European Union turbot and Canada-United States salmon disputes suggests consistency between the principles of the model and reality.

Keywords: Conservation; natural resource management; game theory; optimal control theory; fisheries managment; turbot; salmon; renewable resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q2 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Marine Resource Economics 1.12(1996): pp. 29-36

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