Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs

Ida Ferrara and Paul Missios

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with and provide insights into the particulars of the recent disputes.

Keywords: Conservation; economic theory; natural resource management; game theory; optimal control theory; fisheries management; renewable. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q2 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-08-19
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Marine Resource Economics 4.11(1996): pp. 239-245

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