The Role of MFN under Asymmetries in Environmental Standards

Paul Missios and Halis Yildiz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We critically examine the implications of the most favored nation (MFN) clause under asymmetric environmental standards. Using an oligopolistic intra-industry trade model, we show that environmentally beneficial trade diversion and higher world welfare obtain under tariff discrimination relative to MFN.

Keywords: environmental standards; abatement; international trade; MFN clause (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Economics Letters 2.93(2006): pp. 297-304

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Related works:
Journal Article: The role of MFN under asymmetries in environmental standards (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:70810

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