Endogenous Institutions and Economic Outcomes
Carmine Guerriero ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper evaluates the relative importance of a "culture of cooperation," understood as the implicit reward from cooperating in prisoner's dilemma and investment types of activities, and "inclusive political institutions," which enable the citizenry to check the executive authority. I divide Europe into 120 km X 120 km grid cells, and I exploit exogenous variation in both institutions driven by persistent medieval history. To elaborate, I document strong first-stage relationships between present-day norms of trust and respect and the severity of consumption risk-i.e., climate volatility-over the 1000-1600 period and between present-day regional political autonomy and the factors that raised the returns on elite-citizenry investments in the Middle Ages, i.e., the terrain ruggedness and the direct access to the coast. Using this instrumental variables approach, I show that only culture has a first order effect on development, even after controlling for country fixed effects, medieval innovations, the present-day role of medieval geography, and the factors modulating the impact of institutions. Crucially, the excluded instruments have no direct impact on development, and the effect of culture holds within pairs of adjacent grid cells with different medieval climate volatility. An explanation for these results is that culture, but not a more inclusive political process, is necessary to produce public-spirited politicians and push voters to punish political malfeasance. Micro-evidence from Italian Parliament data supports this idea.
Keywords: Geography; Culture; Democracy; Development; Political Accountability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H1 O1 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro, nep-pr~ and nep-soc
Date: 2013-07-15, Revised 2015-01-21
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:70879
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