Social capital, perceptions and economic performance

José Hernández () and César Guerrero-Luchtenberg

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper describes how social capital emerges, relates to economic performance and evolves in the long run. Using the concept of psychological equilibrium, two types of individuals are generated in the population regarding their willingness to cooperate. We propose an evolutionary (learning) process over those types driven by the total payoffs of the psychological game, and provide a complete description of its dynamics. Macro-perceptions, defined as the individual perception of how cooperative the society is as a whole, are key to explain convergence to the full social capital state in the long run.

Keywords: Psychological Equilibrium; Belief-dependent Behavior; Evolutionary Games; Replicator Dynamics; Economic Development. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-pke, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Theoretical Economic Letters 2.6(2016): pp. 214-227

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71006

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