Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition

Nickolas Michelacakis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper compares the outcomes of two three-stage games of two firms competing for quantity with managerial delegation. In fact, we prove that simultaneous choice of managers by the proprietors of the firms followed by Stackelberg-type competition is equivalent to sequential choice of managers followed by Cournot-type competition. We prove equivalence in a general setting, namely, when the duopolistic model is characterised by a non-linear inverse demand function.

Keywords: Strategic delegation; Cournot competition; Stackelberg competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-pke
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71052/1/MPRA_paper_71052.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71052

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().