Tax burden optimization on economic agents by modeling interaction in the taxation system

Dmytro Sokolovskyi () and Olena Sokolovska

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper aims to propose the approach to classify the industries in terms of easiness of tax evasion. Basing on assumptions of taxpayer’s behavior, our results allow defining the type of dependence of real tax rates on their nominal ones. We find that the graph, describing the taxpayer’s behavior, has two key points: maximum – the optimal tax rate (if this rate increase, the real tax revenues fall), and also the point of simple reproduction (after achieving this level, firms stop to pay taxes at all with appropriate shifting into informal sector or closing down). I.e. two key levels of tax burden: «optimal» and «zero» can be defined. The values of those parameters for taxpayers operating in different groups of industries were calculated.

Keywords: tax burden; economic behavior; tax evasion; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G38 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-05, Revised 2016-05-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71110/1/MPRA_paper_71110.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71110

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().