Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution with Endogenous Distribution of Political Power

Yuta Saito

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates a dynamic capital taxation (and redistribution) problem with an endogenous political power balance. It is shown that the current redistribution, which reduces the future inequality, decreases the future needs for redistribution if the bargaining power is (at least partly) endogenized.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; Wealth inequality; Redistribution; Capital taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E60 E62 H20 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71130

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